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With rapid growth of networking technology, digital data can
be transferred easily over the Internet. But security and protec-
tion of sensitive digital information during transmission is a
great concern in commercial, medical and military applica-
tions. Two methods cryptography [1,2] and data hiding [3]
have been used to increase the security of the digital data such
as images. Nevertheless, one of the common vulnerabilities of
both these methods is ‘‘single point of failure’’ (SPOF) as they
use single storage mechanism and therefore data can be easily
misplaced or damaged. Secret image sharing schemes (SISS)are useful options. The basic idea behind secret sharing is to
transform a secret into n number of ‘‘shadows’’ or ‘‘shares’’
that can be carried and stored disjointedly. The secret can only
be restored from any k shadows (k 6 n) and any (k  1) or
fewer shadows cannot reveal anything close to that secret.
The secret sharing schemes (SIS) were ﬁrst introduced by
Blakley [4] and Shamir [5] separately in 1979. Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme is a (k,n) threshold-based secret sharing scheme.
It is basedon (k  1) degree polynomial andLagrange interpola-
tion. In2002,ThienandLin [6]proposedan(k,n) thresholdbased
secret image sharing scheme (SISS) by extending Shamir’s poly-
nomial approach. In their scheme, the pixel value larger than
250 is always truncated to 250 before the generation of shares.
This loss of pixel value has the truncation distortion which is
the chief drawbackofThien–Lin scheme.Thien’swork attracted
many researchers to suggest different techniques which are
applied in the literature [7,8].Recently,Wu [9] has smartly solved
the ‘‘truncation distortion’’ problem.
Blakley’s proposed secret sharing scheme is established by
using geometric approach. According to his method, the secret
202 A. Nag et al.is a point in a k-dimensional space and the hyper-planes in that
space are deﬁned by the n number of shadows. For sharing of
secret image, Blakley’s geometric approach has been taken by
Chen–Fu [10]. The probability of only containing one shared
image to obtain the secret image of Chen–Fu is higher than
Lin–Thien’s scheme. In 2008, Tso ﬁrst quantized the secret
image and then applied Blakley’s concepts to share the quan-
tized image [11]. However, due to quantization errors, recon-
structed image is not distortion free.
Another common drawback of all the above (k,n) threshold
secret image sharing schemes is the lack of the property of ver-
iﬁcation, i.e. in all these schemes it is presumed that the origi-
nal secret image holder known as the dealer and the
participants are not cheated. However, the following two situ-
ations may also arise:
(1) The cheating by the dealer: A dealer may provide a fake
share to a particular participant.
(2) The cheating by a participant: One participant may sup-
ply a fake shadow to the other participants.
In [7], the author proposed veriﬁable secret image sharing
scheme (VSISS) in which the cheaters (a dishonest dealer or
a dishonest participant) can easily be distinguished. Merely
as the authors of [7] adopted Thien–Lin scheme for share gen-
eration and secret reconstruction, their scheme suffers from the
major drawback of Thien–Lin which has already been hashed
out before. Thus to perfectly recover, Zhao employed the tech-
nique of carving up a pixel whose value is larger than 250 into
two which charge extra storage. In [12], Wu et al. proposed a
secret sharing scheme based on cellular automata. Though Wu
et al. remove the problems of truncation distortion or pixel
division it does not bring out any veriﬁcation to identify
cheaters.
In this paper, we propose a novel (k,n) threshold veriﬁable
secret image sharing scheme (VSISS) which generates
encrypted shares. The proposed method can identify cheaters
and recover the original secret without any deprivation. More-
over the probability of guessing of one correct shared image of
the proposed method is minimized.2. Preliminaries
2.1. The 3rd order LFSR sequence
In this section we brieﬂy present the 3rd order linear-feedback
shift register (LFSR) sequence [13]. Let f(x) be an irreducible
polynomial over F= GF(p), where p is a prime. Then f(x) is
deﬁned as
fðxÞ ¼ x3  ax2 þ bx 1; a; b 2 F ð1Þ
A sequence S ¼ Stf g is a third-order homogeneous LFSR
sequence with a characteristic polynomial f(x) if the elements
of S satisfy the following recursive relation
St ¼ aSt1  bSt2 þ St3; t  3 ð2Þ
where S0 ¼ 3;S1 ¼ a and S2 ¼ a2  2b, then f(x) generates the
characteristic sequence S= {St}. We represent St as St a; bð Þ or
St(f), and S as S(a,b) or S(f).
Assume that a1, a2, a3 are all three roots of f(x) in the split-
ting ﬁeld of f(x) over F. According to Newton’s formula, theelements of S can be represented by the symmetric tth power
sum of the roots as follows:
St ¼ at1 þ at2 þ at3; t ¼ 0; 1 ð3Þ
The period of f(x) is denoted as per(f).
Lemma 1 ([13][14]). Let f(x) = x3  ax2 + bx  1 be a
polynomial over F, a1, a2, a3 be three roots of f(x) over F, and
S ¼ Stf g be the characteristic sequence generated by f(x). Let
fðxÞ ¼ ðx at1Þðx at2Þ x at3
 
.
(i) f tðxÞ ¼ x3  Stða; bÞx2 þ Stða; bÞx 1; where Stða; bÞ
¼ St b; að Þ.
(ii) If f(x) is irreducible over F, then f(x) and ft(x) have the
same period if and only if (per(f), t) = 1.
(iii) If (per(f), k) = 1, then f(x) is irreducible over F if and
only if ft(x) is irreducible over F.
Theorem 1 ([13]). Let f(x) = x3  ax2 + bx  1 be a polyno-
mial over F, and let S be the characteristic sequence generated by
f(x). Then for all positive integers t and e,
StðSeða; bÞ;Seða; bÞÞ ¼ Steða; bÞ ¼ SeðStða; bÞ;Stða; bÞÞ ð4Þ
The theorem 1 has been proved in [13]. This theorem guaran-
tees the commutative property. If we consider a and b as vari-
ables in F and t as a ﬁxed integer, then St(a,b) and St(a,b) are
Waring polynomials.
Fact 1 ([13,14]): For a ﬁxed positive integer t, if gcd(t,
pi  1) = 1, i= 1, 2, 3, then for any u, v 2 F, the following sys-
tem of equations has a unique solution (a, b) 2 F · F.
Stða; bÞ ¼ u and St a; bð Þ ¼ v ð5Þ
Otherwise, St(a, b) and St(a, b) are orthogonal in F in variables
a and b.
Lemma 2 ([14]). Let f(x) = x3  ax2 + bx  1 be an irre-
ducible polynomial over F of the period Q = p2 + p + 1 and
S = {St} be the characteristic sequence generated by f(x). Let t
and t0 be different coset leaders modulo Q, and both t and t0 are
relatively prime to Q. Then
ðSt;StÞ – ðSt0 ; St0 Þ ð6Þ
Lemma 2 provides a one-to-one correspondence between the
private key space and the public key space. Fact 1 together
with Lemma 2 can be used to construct a public key encryption
scheme, which is described in next section.
2.2. The LFSR-based public key cryptography
In this section, we introduce the LFSR-based public key cryp-
tography by the 3rd order characteristic sequences. We apply
the following steps to select the public and private keys:
1. Choose two secret prime number p and q.
2. Calculates N= p · q.
3. Calculate the period U of the irreducible polynomial as
U= (p2 + p+ 1)(q2 + q+ 1).
4. Choose a random integer e with gcd(e,pi  1) = 1 for
i= 2, 3.
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6. Public keys: (e,N).
7. Private key: f.
Encryption: If the plaintext P= (P1,P2), where
0 < P1,P2 < N, the cipher text C= (C1,C2) can be generated
by C1 = Se(P1,P2) and C2 = Se(P1,P2).
Decryption: The plaintext P= (P1,P2) can be generated
from the given the cipher text C= (C1,C2) as P1 = Sf(C1,C2)
and P2 = Sf (C1,C2).
3. Proposed secret image sharing scheme (SISS)
In this section we propose a veriﬁable (k,n) secret image shar-
ing scheme based on the 3rd order LFSR-based public key
cryptosystem [13] for veriﬁcation. Our proposed veriﬁable
secret image sharing scheme (VSISS) consists of three phases:
Initialization phase, share generation and reconstruction. Sec-
tion 3.1 presents initialization phase, Section 3.2 presents the
proposed share generation scheme and Section 3.3 introduces
the veriﬁcation and recovery strategy.
3.1. Initialization phase
Dealer (original secret holder) D ﬁrst selects two prime number
p and q to calculate N= p · q and two positive integers a and
b to obtain an irreducible polynomial f xð Þ over F= GF(p),
where f xð Þ ¼ x3  ax2 þ bx 1. Then dealer publishes N, a
and b.
On the other hand, each participant Ai (1 6 i 6 n) also
selects a random number ei from the interval [2,N] as its
own secret shadow where gcd ei; p
r  1ð Þ ¼ 1 for r= 2, 3.
Then each participant Ai computes Seiða; bÞ;Sei a; bð Þð Þ and
provides it to the dealer. Ai also provides its identity number
IDi to the dealer and publishes IDi; seiða; bÞf g. For any two
participants Ai and Aj, the dealer has to ensure that
Seiða; bÞ;Seiða; bÞð Þ– ðSejða; bÞ;Sejða; bÞÞ and IDi „ IDj. The
dealer then generates n shares each of size mMN
k
where m is
deﬁned as
m ¼ dk=4e þ 1 ð7Þ3.2. Share construction phase
The share construction phase generates n encrypted shadow
images of size mMN
k
from a secret image Is of size M · N
where 2 6 k 6 n. The steps of share generation are listed given
below:1. The dealer D randomly chooses an integer e0, where
e0 2 {2 to U}. Then D computes f such that
f · e0 = 1 mod U. Here U is the period of
f xð Þ ¼ x3  ax2 þ bx 1.
2. D calculates R0 ¼ Se0 a; bð Þ; Se0 a; bð Þð Þ and T i ¼ Se0
Sei a; bð Þ; Sei a; bð Þð Þ for each Ai, i= 1,2, . . .,n. Pub-
lishes {R0, f}.
3. Generate a permutation sequence by a secret key KS.
4. Obtain permuted image I0 by permuting the pixels of
original secret image with the help of permutation
sequence generated in step 3.
5. Set i to 1.6. Divide the Secret Image into T number of non-over-
lapping blocks Btf gTt¼1 of 1 · k pixels, where T ¼ MNk .
7. Set t to 1.
8. Select an appropriate hash function and compute
Mi ¼ H T ið Þ for each participant Ai.Mi is also divided
into k non-overlapping blocks of length k bits in such
a way that k  k  Mij j ( j j represents the length).
9. Each jth (1 6 j 6 k) block is converted into k bits
number aj, where aj 2 f0; 1; . . . ; ð2k  1Þg.
0. Create an equation based on k consecutive pixels
{R1,R2, . . .,Rk} of block Bt (generated in step 6) as
st ¼
Xk
rjRj where rj ¼ aj þ 1 ð8Þ
j¼111. St is converted into r= (8 + 2k) bits number as
br1. . .b1b0.
2. Compute x= (8m  r). If r „ 8m, then go to step 13.
Otherwise i.e. if r= 8m, then go to step 14.
3. Generate a random number of length x bits as b0x1 to
b00 and add this x bits sequence in MSB position of
br1. . .b1b0. Thus an 8m bits number b
0
x1 . . . b
0
0
br1 . . . b1b0 i.e. b8m1b8m2. . .b1b0 is obtained.
4. Obtain m gray (8 bits) pixels from 8m bit sequence
(generated in step 12).
pi1 ¼ b7 . . . b1b0
ip2 ¼ b15 . . . b9b8
..
. ..
. ..
.
pim ¼ b8m1 . . . b8m7b8m8
ð9Þ
15. Sequentially assign pi1; p
i
2; . . . ; p
i
m to the ith shadow.6. Increase t by 1.
7. Repeat steps 7 through 16 until t> T.
8. Increase i by 1.
9. Repeat step 5 through 18 until i> n.
0. End.3.3. The veriﬁcation and recovery phase
This section introduces a scheme to reconstruct the original
secret image from k or more shared images. The members of
A= {A1,A2, . . .,An} will recover the secret image. If any k
number of participants verify each other and gathers their
shares, then the original secret will be reconstructed. The steps
of veriﬁcation and recovery of original secret image Is of size
M · N from the veriﬁed encrypted shares Ei (1 6 i 6 k) of size
mMN
k
are given as follows:
1. Each Ai 2 A ﬁrst produces T 0i ¼ Sei Se0 a; bð Þ; Se0ð
a; bð ÞÞ to get the share, where ei represents the shadow
of Pi.
2. Any participant Aj in A Ai – Aj
 
can verify T 0i provided
by Ai with a test if Sf T
0
i
  ¼ Sei a; bð Þ. If this test is suc-
cessful, then A0i is true and veriﬁed and then goto step
3, otherwise A0i is false and is identiﬁed as cheater and
exit.
3. Each veriﬁed participant Ai generates M
0
i ¼ H T 0i
 
. M 0i is
divided into k non-overlapping blocks D0r (1 6 r 6 k) of
size B= k bits where k  k  Mij j.
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non-overlapping blocks Bit
 T
t¼1 of 1 · m pixels, where
T ¼ MNk and 1 6 i 6 k.
5. Set t to 1.
6. Set i to 1.
7. For m consecutive pixels pi1; p
i
2; . . . p
i
m of block B
i
r in
shadow image Si obtain the binary sequence as
i i i ip1 ¼ b7 . . . b1b0
pi2 ¼ bi15 . . . bi9bi8
..
. ..
. ..
.
pim ¼ bi8m1 . . . bi8m7bi8m8
ð10Þ8. Concatenate the bits stream of all m pixels and generate
a bit sequence of size 8m as bi8m1 . . . b
i
1b
i
0.
9. Compute r as r= (8 + 2k). If r= 8m, then goto step
11.
10. Divide the 8m bits sequence into two different
sequences, one of x= (8m  r) bits long and another
of r bits as bi8k1 . . . b
i
rþ1b
i
r and b
i
r1 . . . b
i
1b
i
0 respectively.
11. Obtain a r bits number Sit as S
i
t ¼ bir1 . . . bi1bi0 and dis-
card bi8k1 . . . b
i
rþ1b
i
r.
12. Create a linear equation:
kX
j¼1
rijRjt ¼ Sit where rij ¼ aj þ 1 ð11Þ13. Increase i by 1.
14. Repeat steps 7 through 13 until i> k.
15. k number of linear equations of type (11) are created.
16. Use these k equations to solve R1t, R2t, . . ., Rkt in Eq.
(11). They are the corresponding k pixel values of the
tth block in the permuted image I 0s.
17. Repeat steps 6 through 16 until t> T.
18. Generate a permutation sequence by a secret key KS.
19. Apply the inverse permutation operation to the per-
muted image I 0s to recover the original secret image Is.
20. End.Figure 1 (a) Secret image (Lena), (b) reconstStep 1 and step 2 ensure that all participants can work
together to verify whether one or more participant among
them are cheaters. This veriﬁcation could be performed with-
out revealing the corresponding shares. In other words, even
if any (k  1) veriﬁed participants gather their shares, then also
revealing the original secret is not possible. Because (k  1)
veriﬁed participants can create exactly (k  1) numbers of
equations of type (11) which is insufﬁcient to obtain the values
of k number of variables (in this case the values of R1t, R2t, -
. . ., Rkt). To obtain the values of R1t, R2t, . . ., Rkt at least k
equations of type (11) are required. Thus the proposed scheme
fulﬁlls the requirement of Shamir’s (k,n) secret sharing (SS)
scheme i.e. using proposed VSISS any k or more than k sha-
dow images can reconstruct the original secret image, but
any (k  1) cannot reveal any information.
4. Experimental results and discussion
4.1. Experimental results
This section presents the experimental results of the proposed
(k, n) secret image sharing system. A (4,6) secret sharing
experiment is chosen to indicate the operation of the pro-
posed method. Grayscale test images ‘‘Lena’’, ‘‘Airplane’’,
‘‘Barbara’’, ‘‘Peppers’’ and ‘‘Couple’’ of size 256 · 256 are used
as a secret (input) images as depicted in Figs. 1(a), 2(a), 3(a),
4(a), 5(a) and Figs. 1(b), 2(b), 3(b), 4(b), 5(b) are the recon-
structed image respectively. Both of the set of ({1(a), 2(a),
3(a), 4(a), 5(a)} and ({1(b), 2(b), 3(b), 4(b), 5(b)}) images are
indistinguishable. Figs. 1–5(c)–(h) show the noisy share images
of size 256 · 128.
4.2. Analysis of correlation coefﬁcient
The correlation coefﬁcient rxy between a pair of random vari-
ables (x,y) can be calculated by the following formula:ructed image, (c)–(h): four shadow images.
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DðxÞp ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃDðyÞp
where
cov x; yð Þ ¼ 1
MN
XMN
i¼1
xi  E xð Þð Þ yi  E yð Þð Þ
E xið Þ ¼ 1
MN
XMN
i¼1
xi;D xð Þ ¼ 1
MN
XMN
i¼1
xi  E xð Þð Þ2
ð12Þ
In our experiment (x,y) pair chosen as one pair of adjacent
pixels in vertical, horizontal and diagonal directions. To com-
pute the correlation coefﬁcients of pairs of adjacent pixels, we
choose 2048 random pairs of neighboring pixels in all three
directions from the secret image and encrypted shared images.
The correlation coefﬁcients of two adjacent pixels in Fig. 1 in
all three directions are listed in Table 1 and compared with the
results in Refs. [2,12]. With regard to obtained results listed in
Table 1 it is clear that the pixels in the encrypted shares of the
proposed method are in feeble correlations, then the encryp-
tion result is quite serious.
4.3. Analysis of structural similarity index metric (SSIM)
To check how dissimilar the encrypted shares from each other,
we have used another well-known quality metric know as the
Structural Similarity Index Metric (SSIM). It was developed
by Wang et al. [15] in 2004. SSIM compares local patterns of
pixel intensities that have been normalized for luminance dis-
tortion and contrast distortion. The values of the SSIM index
are ranging from 0 to 1. A value of 0 shows two images (origi-
nal and encrypted) are all dissimilar and 1 means the reverse
one. If two images are X and Y, the SSIM is deﬁned as:
SSIM X;Yð Þ ¼ 2lXlY þ C1ð Þ 2rXY þ C2ð Þ
l2X þ l2Y þ C1ð Þ r2X þ r2Y þ C2ð Þ
ð13ÞFigure 2 (a) Secret image (Airplane), (b) reconwhere lX and lY are the mean intensity of X and Y respec-
tively, r2X and r
2
Y are the variance of X and Y respectively;
rXY the covariance between X and Y. C1 = (k1L)
2,
C2 = (k2L)
2 are two variables to stabilize the division with
weak denominator and L is the dynamic range of the pixel-val-
ues chosen as L= 255. The value of k1 (1) and k2 (1) is chosen
as k1 = 0.01; k2 = 0.03. SSIM values of share images for our
experimentation are given in Table 2. The SSIM values of
Table 2 shows that each encrypted share is totally dissimilar
from the other encrypted shares. These strengthen the claim
of the security of the proposed method.
4.4. Cheating prevention
Each participant can easily prevent cheating before secret
image reconstruction by verifying that if another participant
provides correct or faulty data. Theorem 2 analyzes the veriﬁ-
cation capability of the proposed scheme. Hence the proposed
method has the power to preclude cheating. On the other
hand, the scheme [6,8–12] does not support veriﬁcation thus
cannot prevent cheating. The length of the key (private/public)
used in cheating prevention is shorter in comparison with
Zhao et al.’s [7] scheme for same for the same degree of
protection.
Theorem 2. Anyone can verify by another participant Ai by
computing Sf T
0
i
  ¼ Sei a; bð Þ.
Proof. In Section 3.3 if a participant Ai provides true
T0i ¼ Sei Se0 a; bð Þ;Se0 a; bð Þð Þ, then anyone can check whether
T0i is a cheater as
SfðT0iÞ ¼ Sf Sei Se0 a; bð Þ;Se0 a; bð Þð Þð Þ
¼ Sf Se0 Sei a; bð Þ;Sei a; bð Þð Þð Þ
¼ Sfe0 Sei a; bð Þ;Sei a; bð Þð Þ
¼ Sei a; bð Þ since fei ¼ 1mod Ustructed image, (c)–(h): four shadow images.
Figure 3 (a) Secret image (Barbara), (b) reconstructed image, (c)–(h): four shadow images.
Figure 4 (a) Secret image (Peppers), (b) reconstructed image, (c)–(h): four shadow images.
206 A. Nag et al.Let a participant Ai publishes wrong information T
0
i ¼ Sev
Se0 a; bð Þ;Se0 a; bð Þð Þ by providing wrong key Sev . Now if par-
ticipant Aj wants to verify whether T
0
i is true by computing
Sf T
0
i
  ¼ Sev a; bð Þ– Sei a; bð Þ. So our proposed scheme has
anti-cheating property and thus a veriﬁable scheme.4.5. Computation overhead
The proposed scheme uses an LFSR-based public key crypto-
system for cheating prevention. The LFSR is a one-way func-
tion which has lower computation cost than exponentiationfunction [16]. Hence the proposed scheme has low computa-
tional overhead for cheating prevention than Zhao et al.’s
scheme as it involves exponentiation computation for cheating
prevention.
4.6. Security of the proposed scheme
The security of the proposed scheme is employed according to
the 3rd order LFSR-based public key cryptosystem. This sec-
tion presents the resistance capability of the proposed scheme
against the attacks such as brute-force attack and collusion
attack:
Figure 5 (a) Secret image (Couple), (b) reconstructed image, (c)–(h): four shadow images.
Table 1 Comparisons of the correlation coefﬁcient rxy of Lena (gray-scale).
Direction Original – Fig(a) (rxy) Proposed Ref. [2] rxy of encrypted image Ref. [12]
Encrypted shares rxy Encrypted shares rxy
Horizontal 0.9768 Fig. 1 (c) 0.0117 0.0004 1 0.0066
Fig. 1 (d) 0.0058 2 0.0010
Fig. 1 (e) 0.0074 3 0.0027
Fig. 1 (f) 0.0022 4 0.0090
Fig. 1 (g) 0.0014
Fig. 1 (h) 0.0047
Vertical 0.9132 Fig. 1 (c) 0.0091 0.0021 1 0.0211
Fig. 1 (d) 0.0064 2 0.0101
Fig. 1 (e) 0.0029 3 0.0097
Fig. 1 (f) 0.0012 4 0.089
Fig. 1 (g) 0.0108
Fig. 1 (h) 0.0052
Diagonal 0.9428 Fig. 1 (c) 0.0021 0.0038 1 0.0074
Fig. 1 (d) 0.0053 2 0.0056
Fig. 1 (e) 0.0029 3 0.0101
Fig. 1 (f) 0.0030 4 0.0205
Fig. 1 (g) 0.0073
Fig. 1 (h) 0.0019
Table 2 SSIM values between each pair of shares generated
by the proposed scheme.
Shares SSIM
Fig. 1(h) Fig. 1(g) Fig. 1(f) Fig. 1(e) Fig. 1(d)
Fig. 1(c) 0.0201 0.0033 0.0101 0.0036 0.0044
Fig. 1(d) 0.0083 0.0013 0.0057 0.0012
Fig. 1(e) 0.0105 0.0108 0.0089
Fig. 1(f) 0.0015 0.0208
Fig. 1(g) 0.0103
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for each Pij and at least k shares are required to reconstruct
the secret image, attackers have to guess at least k number
of Pij values, which has P 256; kð Þ ¼ 256 255    
256 kþ 1ð Þ possible values. Now for all T number of blocks
of the secret image, the probability to reconstruct the original
secret is 1
pð256;kÞð ÞT ¼ 1pð256;kÞð ÞMNk . This probability is really
depressed; yet less than the probability of Li et al.’s [17]
scheme. Thus the proposed scheme is completely secure
scheme that could protect the original secret against the brute
force attack in a high probability.
Table 3 Comparisons among the proposed scheme and the other related schemes.
Thien–Lin [6] Zhao et al. [7] Lin–Wang [8] Wu [9] Chen–Fu [10] Proposed
Probability of guessing
one correct share image
1
251
 MN
k 1
251
 MN
k 1
251
 MN
k 1
256
 MN
k 1
128
 MN
k 1
256
 MN
k
Cheating prevention/Veriﬁcation
capability
NO YES NO NO NO YES
Distortion free
recovery
NO NO NO YES YES YES
Extra storage YES YES NO NO NO NO
Encrypted shadow
size
MN
k
MN
k
MN
k
MN
k Same as original
secret image MNð Þ
mMN
k ; where m ¼ dk=4e þ 1
Secure channel is needed YES YES NO YES YES NO
Probability of brute
force attack
Low Low Low Low Very low Very low
Can resists collusion attack NO NO YES NO NO YES
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collusion attack as at the beginning each of the participants
has to pass the veriﬁcation phase (step 2 of Section 3.3). Even
if two participants Ai and Aj plan to recover the original secret
image by exchanging their Sei and Sej values, their conspiracy
will be identiﬁed as each of participants Ai have provided their
unique identity number IDi to the dealer and published
IDi; sei a; bð Þf g. This type conspiracy can easily be detected by
other participants. Thus proposed scheme is robust against
collusion attack.4.7. Merit of the proposed scheme
To further assess the performance of the proposed scheme,
comparisons among the proposed scheme and the other related
schemes [6–11] are listed in Table 3. The virtues of the pro-
posed scheme are drawn as follows:
 Probability of guessing: For a secret image of size M  Nð Þ,
there are NNk blocks as secret image is decomposed into
blocks of size k pixels. In the recovery phase, to obtain k
pixels, which are the coefﬁcients of Eq. (11), at least k equa-
tions are required. If a malicious user gathers (k  1) sha-
dow images, he/she can create only (k  1) equations. The
possibility of exact solution is then only 1
256
. Hence, for
MN
k blocks, the possibility of receiving the correct image
is 1
256
 MN
k . In contrast, the probability of Thien–Lin [6]
and Chen–Fu [10] are 1
251
 MN
k and 1
128
 MN
k respectively,
which are less than proposed scheme of 1
256
 MN
k .
 Extra storage and distortion free recovery: To avoid the
truncation distortion and lossless recovery, the schemes
[6,7] divide one pixel into two and used extra storage to
storage than new pixel. On the other hand, the proposed
scheme and the schemes [9,10] can recover the original
secret image losslessly without extra storage. Though the
scheme [8] does not use any extra storage, but recovery is
not lossless.
 Shadow size: The shadows of our scheme are little larger
than the schemes [6–9] but smaller (for k> 3) than Chen-
Fu’s scheme [10].Our proposed veriﬁable secret image sharing approach has
the following properties:
1. The proposed scheme can produce the highly conﬁdential
encrypted shadows.
2. The generated shadow images are smaller in size with
respect to the secret image.
3. The secret image can be perfectly reconstructed from any k
different shadows.
4. The original secret image cannot be reconstructed when any
(k  1) fewer shadows are gathered.
5. Each shadow is veriﬁable by others and thus no secure
channel is required.
6. The proposed scheme can easily resist brute force attack
and collusion attack.
The theoretical analysis and experimental results show that
our proposed approach gives the above excellent properties.
5. Conclusion
Secret image sharing is an effective scheme which provides
conﬁdentiality and integrity of the sensitive image. In this
paper a novel veriﬁable secret image sharing scheme based
on the (k,n) threshold and 3rd order LFSR-based public key
cryptosystem is proposed. This new VSISS generates meaning-
less shares, which are hard to identify. It can also prevent
cheating in the existing secret image sharing schemes and
robust against brute force attack and collusion attack. The size
of each shadow image is relatively small (k> 3). What is
more, the proposed system can reconstruct the original secret
without any loss and for that it does not load any additional
memory. Experimental results and analyses indicate the
strength and efﬁciency of the proposed scheme.
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